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Abstract
This paper develops a model of the Chinese economy using a DSGE framework
that accommodates a banking sector and money. The model is used to shed light on
the period of the recent period of financial crisis. It differs from other applications in
the use of indirect inference to estimate and test the fitted model. We find that the
main shocks that hit China in the crisis were international and that domestic banking
shocks were unimportant. Officially mandated bank lending and government spending
were used to supplement monetary policy to aggressively offset shocks to demand. An
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policy can be used more vigorously to stabilise the economy, making direct banking
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1 Introduction
The rapid development of the Chinese economy since the 1980s has attracted the attention
of numerous scholars – some positive about its future1 and others less so2. Research on
the modelling of the Chinese macro-economy has also grown with a number of papers also
available to the non-Chinese reader. These models are the familiar demand led, and data
generated type vintage3. While a few of studies utilising the DSGE framework have emerged
in recent years there has been no effort to model the Chinese business cycle including a
banking sector. In an earlier paper (Le, Meenagh, Matthews, Minford and Xiao, 2014,
LMMMX) we explored such an approach and reported some success. In this paper we take
matters further by adding a fuller monetary sector. In the previous paper we incorporated
the Bernanke et al. (1999, BGG) model of the banking system but paid no explicit attention
to balance sheets, the quantity of money and bank credit. Here we try to develop a framework
that allows us to comment on policy relating monetary quantities and bank credit (including
the activity of the shadow banking system) as opposed to just interest rates.
This paper employs a variant of the Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007, SW) model due to
Le et al. (2011). The model is augmented with the quantity of credit and money, in a way
we explain in detail below. The basic idea is that the monetary base acts as collateral for
loans because it is entirely liquid and riskless. Hence it is a powerful agent of credit growth
in a way that has hitherto been relatively neglected in DSGE models.
The focus of this paper is empirical. We apply a powerful testing procedure to this
theoretical set-up, and check whether China’s business cycle behaviour can be explained by
this theory4.
1Notably Chow (2007) and more recently Coase and Wang (2012)
2See Huang (2008)
3See for example Chow (2011), Qin et al. (2007), Sun et al. (2009), the CQMM (Xiamen University
China Quarterly Macroeconomic Model) and the CUFEM (Central University of Finance and Economics
Model).
4We are treading to some extent in the footsteps of earlier work done for China without banking by
Dai (2012) which managed to fit a model of this type on stationary data to the joint behaviour of output,
inflation and interest rates.
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Figure 1: China Log Real GDP and Pre-Crisis Trend
China was not immune to the global financial crisis. As LMMMX (2014) show, China
(Figure 1) too experienced a severe loss of output in the crisis and suffered a strong growth
slowdown and like mostWestern economies has not recouped this loss nor reached its previous
trend growth rate. The purpose of this paper is to see whether the evolution of the Chinese
economy during this period can be plausibly explained within our set up.
To anticipate our results, we estimate a version of this model to fit the Chinese economy
covering this crisis period. The model tells us that the main shocks hitting China in the crisis
were international and that Chinese banking shocks were a modest contributor. However
the state banking system together with direct government spending was used to supplement
monetary policy in aggressively offsetting the crisis on GDP. It seems that while Chinese
capitalism is as vulnerable as any to crises, such is the importance of growth to the Chinese
leadership’s strategy that the state retains powerful instruments to mitigate the effects of
crises on growth. Nevertheless, their use has the potential to destabilise the economy.
In our empirical procedures we use the indirect inference (II) procedure to test the model
on some initial parameter values, mainly based on US data, and then allow the parameters to
be moved flexibly to the values that maximise the criterion of replicating the data behaviour
– indirect estimation. This allows us to test the model itself rather than a particular set of
parameter values that could be at fault. The basic reason for using II over the now-popular
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Bayesian ML is that it tests the overall ability of the model to replicate key aspects of data
behaviour – there is no guarantee that Bayesian estimates will pass this test.
The rest of this paper is as follows: in the next section we set out the model in outline,
incorporating the modified BGG framework to the SWmodel. In the third section, we review
the current state of DSGE modelling of the Chinese economy and describe the state of the
banking sector. In the fourth section we explain our testing procedure, based on the method
of II whereby the model’s simulated behaviour is compared statistically with the behaviour
found in the data; we also explain the method of indirect estimation. In the fifth section, we
set out the empirical results for the model. The model is used to analyse the banking crisis
and to speculate on the causes of future crises. In the penultimate section we consider how
monetary policy could be reformed to minimise the occurrence of crises, independently of
the regulative solutions now widely being suggested. Our final section concludes, with some
reflections on the implications for China’s banking.
2 The SW and BGG models
2.1 The Models in Brief
One of the main faults of the first type of calibrated DSGE model, the real business cycle
(RBC) model, was its failure to capture the stylised features of the labour market observed
in actual data. Employment was found to be not nearly volatile enough in the RBC model
compared with observed data, and the correlation between real wages and output was found
to be much too high (see, for example, King, Plosser and Rebelo, 1988). In the New-
Keynesian tradition, the SW marks a major development in macroeconometric modelling
based on the DSGE framework. Its main aim is to construct and estimate a DSGE model in
which prices and wages, and hence real wages, are sticky due to nominal and real frictions in
both the goods and labour markets, and to examine the consequent effects of monetary policy
which is set through a Taylor rule. SW combine both calibration and Bayesian estimation
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methods.
The SW model contains a full range of structural shocks. In the euro-area version –
Smets and Wouters (2003) – on which the US version is based, there are ten structural
shocks. These are reduced to seven in the US version: for total factor productivity, the risk
premium, investment-specific technology, the wage mark-up, the price mark-up, exogenous
spending and monetary policy. These shocks are generally assumed to have an autoregressive
structure. The model finds that aggregate demand has hump-shaped responses to nominal
and real shocks.
Smets and Wouters made various tests of their model and subsequently Del Negro,
Schorfheide, Smets and Wouters (2007) examined the model by considering the extent to
which its restrictions help to explain the data. Estimating the SW model using Bayesian
methods, they approximate it by a VAR in vector error-correction form and compare this
with an unrestricted VAR fitted to actual data that ignores cross-equation restrictions. A
hyperparameter λ to measure the relative weights of the two VARs is chosen to maximise
the marginal likelihood of the combined models. However, none of these exercises in eval-
uating the SW model were a test of specification in the classical sense. Le et al. (2011)
proposed such a test, a Wald test based on indirect inference which compares the model’s
VAR representation with the VAR estimated from the data, and showed that over the full
post-war sample the original SW New Keynesian (NK) model was rejected. In addition,
they examined an alternative ‘New Classical’ (NC) version in which prices and wages were
fully flexible but there was a simple one-period information delay for labour suppliers. This
NC version was also rejected by the test. A hybrid version that was a weighted average of
the corresponding NK and NC equations got much closer to the data for the full sample.
Essentially, the NK model generated too little nominal variation while the NC model
delivered too much. However the hybrid model was able to reproduce the variances of the
data; and it is this key feature that enables it to match the data overall more closely. It is
this version that we use here, adding to it the BGG model of banking.
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The BGG financial sector produces certain changes in this model but much remains
unchanged. Production is divided into three distinct participants: as previously, retailers
and intermediate goods producers (now called entrepreneurs for a reason described later)
and in addition, capital producers. Retailers function in the same way as before, operating
in perfect competition to produce final goods by aggregating differentiated intermediate
products using the Dixit-Stiglitz technology. With the assumption that retail output is
made up of a fixed proportion of intermediate goods in an imperfectly competitive market
and intermediate goods sold competitively, the aggregate price is a weighted average of prices
received in the two types of market. As a result, the aggregate price equation is unchanged.
Capital producers operate in a competitive market and take prices as given. They buy final
consumption goods and transform them into capital to be sold on to entrepreneurs.
The difference in BGG lies in the nature of entrepreneurs. They still produce intermediate
goods, but now they do not rent capital from households (who do not buy capital but only
buy bonds or deposits) but must buy it from capital producers and in order to buy this
capital they have to borrow from a bank which converts household savings into lending. On
the production side, entrepreneurs face the same situation as in Le et al. (2011). They
hire labour from households for wages that are partly set in monopolistic, and partly in
competitive labour markets. Similarly they buy capital from capital producers at prices
of goods also set in a mixture of monopolistic and competitive goods markets. Thus the
production function, the labour demand and real marginal cost equations are unchanged. It
is on their financing side that there are major changes.
Entrepreneurs buy capital using their own net worth, pledged against loans from the
bank, which thus intermediates household savings deposited with it at the risk-free rate of
return. The net worth of entrepreneurs is kept below the demand for capital by a fixed death
rate of these firms (1− θ); the stock of firms is kept constant by an equal birth rate of new
firms. Entrepreneurial net worth nt therefore is given by the past net worth of surviving
firms plus their total return on capital cyt minus the expected return (which is paid out
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in borrowing costs to the bank) on the externally financed part of their capital stock –
equivalent to
nt = θnt−1 +
K
N
(cyt − Et−1cyt) + Et−1cyt + enwt (1)
where K
N
is the steady state ratio of capital expenditures to entrepreneurial net worth,
θ is the survival rate of entrepreneurs and enwt is a net worth shock. Those who die will
consume their net worth, so that entrepreneurial consumption cet is equal to (1 − θ) times
net worth. In logs this implies that this consumption varies in proportion to net worth so
that:
cet = nt (2)
In order to borrow, entrepreneurs sign a debt contract prior to the realisation of idio-
syncratic shocks on the return to capital: they choose their total capital and the associated
borrowing before the shock realisation. The optimal debt contract takes a state-contigent
form to ensure that the expected gross return on the bank’s lending is equal to the bank op-
portunity cost of lending. When the idiosyncratic shock hits, there is a critical threshold for
it such that for shock values above the threshold, the entrepreneur repays the loan and keeps
the surplus, while for values below it, he would default, with the bank keeping whatever
is available. From the first order conditions of the optimal contract, the external finance
premium is equated with the expected marginal product of capital which under constant
returns to scale is exogenous to the individual firm (and given by the exogenous technology
parameter); hence the capital stock of each entrepreneur is proportional to his net worth,
with this proportion increasing as the expected marginal product rises, driving up the ex-
ternal finance premium. Thus the external finance premium increases with the amount of
the firm’s capital investment that is financed by borrowing:
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Etcyt+1 − (rt − Etπt+1) = χ (qqt + kt − nt) + eprt (3)
where the coefficient χ > 0 measures the elasticity of the premium with respect to
leverage. Entrepreneurs leverage up to the point where the expected return on capital
equals the cost of borrowing from financial intermediaries. The external finance premium
also depends on an exogenous premium shock, eprt. This can be thought of as a shock to the
supply of credit: that is, a change in the efficiency of the financial intermediation process,
or a shock to the financial sector that alters the premium beyond what is dictated by the
current economic and policy conditions.
Entrepreneurs buy capital kt at price qqt in period t and uses it in (t+ 1) production. At
(t+ 1) entrepreneurs receive the marginal product of capital rkt+1 and the ex-post aggregate
return to capital is cyt+1. The capital arbitrage equation (Tobin’s Q equation) becomes:
qqt =
1− δ
1− δ +RK∗
Etqqt+1 +
RK∗
1− δ +RK∗
Etrkt+1 −Etcyt+1 (4)
The resulting investment by entrepreneurs is therefore reacting to a Q-ratio that includes
the effect of the risk-premium. There are as before investment adjustment costs. Thus, the
investment Euler equation and capital accumulation equations are unchanged from Le et al.
(2011). The output market-clearing condition becomes:
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
innt +R
K
∗ ky
1− ψ
ψ
rkt + c
e
yc
e
t + egt (5)
where yt is output, ct is consumption, innt is investment and egt is the exogenous demand
shock.
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2.2 Modifications to the BGG model to allow effects of Quantita-
tive Easing and Bank Regulation:
In the years since the crisis there have been key developments in the monetary scene. The
first has been the zero bound on official interest rates in developed economies, as central
banks have driven the rate at which they will lend to banks down virtually to zero; however,
this has not occurred in China. The second development has been aggressive open market
operations (‘Quantitative Easing’), intended to inject liquidity into the banking system and
spur greater credit creation. The third has been more intrusive regulation of banks, via
increased capital and liquidity ratios. Both these last two elements have occurred in China
and it seems important to us to introduce into the model here a tool to deal with each of
these developments.
Let us begin with bank regulation: what this does is to raise the cost of lending to firms
(the credit friction). The regulators insist banks hold as counterpart funds for the credit
assets they hold, not purely deposits that have low cost but also in particular capital; the
latter is more expensive because shareholders putting up such equity require an appropriate
premium to compensate them for the risk the banks’ losses will lose this capital. We do not
model the regulations explicitly through these balance sheet quantities but for simplicity put
into the model an addition to the credit friction, ξ, reflecting these requirements – and also
the costs of other regulative intrusions5.
Next, we consider the role of QE. To deal with this, we note that in BGG firms put up no
collateral. Net worth by construction is all invested in plant, machinery and other capital.
However, once so invested, this amount cannot be recovered at original value plainly: it will
have less value as second hand sales when the firm goes bankrupt because it has become
specialised to the firm’s activities. The cost of bankruptcy recovery (costly state verification)
applies to the valuation of the activity this capital still allows.
It is in fact normal for banks to request an amount of collateral from the firms to which
5Such as ‘ringfencing’ different activities and imposing high liquidity ratios
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they lend. This gives firms more ‘skin in the game’ and so more incentive to avoid bank-
ruptcy6. We therefore supplement the BGG model by the assumption that banks require
firms to put up the amount of collateral, c, as a fraction of their net worth. We also assume
that recovery of this typical collateral costs a proportion δ of its original value when posted
– we can think of the example of a house being put up and it costing this proportion in
fees and forced-sale losses to sell the house and recover its value in cash. We modify the
workings of the model according to these two assumptions – these modifications are shown
in an appendix.7
It is at this point we introduce the idea of cash as collateral. If a firm holds some cash
on its balance sheet, this can be recovered directly with no loss of value and no verification
cost; thus it eliminates the cost δ. We show in the appendix that the elimination of this cost
lowers the credit premium for given leverage; it therefore permits firms to increase leverage
and so raise their expected returns. We therefore assume that banks and firms have an
interest in firms holding as much cash as can be acquired for collateral. Thus as M0 is issued
we assume that it is acquired by firms from banks to be held as collateral. This effect of the
monetary base on collateral echoes Williamson (2013) in a search model.
The government/central bank issues this cash through open market operations (QE) to
households in exchange for government bonds (GB) they hold. They deposit this cash with
the banks. Firms wish to acquire as much of this cash as possible for their collateral needs.
We can think of them as investing their net worth in cash (to the maximum available), with
the rest going into other collateral and capital. In practice of course their profits (which
create their net worth) are continuously paid out as dividends to the banks which provide
6Some models underpin bank contracting entirely on the basis that banks will only lend against collateral
– Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) – however we do not adopt this extreme position here.
7The posting of collateral actually lowers firms’ profits from borrowing for given net worth and leverage;
this is because collateral has no yield and could be sold for higher profitable investment. Hence it seems to
be puzzling that banks demand collateral in a contract designed to maximise firms’ profits subject to the
constraints of truth-telling and bank zero net profits due to competition. However, undoubtedly collateral is
a routine precaution taken by banks engaged in arm’s length lending. The natural interpretation of collateral
in this context is that it ensures that the borrower does not abscond; in the event of absconding the collateral
is directly seizable. Equivalent amounts are taken in numerous financial transactions as ‘deposits’, ‘margin’
and so on.
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them with credit, so they have nothing with which to acquire these assets if they do not
collaborate with banks. So they achieve this balance sheet outcome by agreeing with the
banks that, as a minimum counterpart to the credit advanced they will hold the maximum
cash collateral available, which is M0. Thus all of M0 at once finds its way into firms’ balance
sheets, where it is securely pledged to the banks in the event of bankruptcy (for example by
being actually lodged with them).8
Finally, we model the rate on official lending to the banks by the central bank as now: it
is exogenously chosen according to some rule, such as the Taylor Rule. We assume that in
normal times the central bank enforces this rule via discount window operations so that M0
is endogenous – supporting the lending implied by the Taylor Rule. It does so in a manner
that keeps δ within some normal range (reflecting the normal share of M0 in collateral and
also the normal cost of acquiring M0 via the Bank discount window). However, at the zero
bound the Taylor Rule is suspended and the central bank is creating M0 independently via
open market operations and in such a way as to bring down δ sufficiently to absorb the
supply, which is in excess of what is required to support lending at a normal δ. It thus
operates to expand lending beyond what would normally be associated with the bounded
interest rate, by driving down the cost of collateral. In effect under QE it is providing M0
at less expense to the banks since it is not providing it through the discount window on
8One might ask: could not bank deposits be held as collateral? Consider first whether a firm collaborating
with bank A could hold deposits in bank B as collateral for its bank A credit. The problem for bank A
would be that it would know bank B would lend out these deposits to other firms against those firms’
collateral. Thus the average bank deposit has as its counterpart asset bank credit, which is leveraged on
firms’ collateral. If firms could hold other banks’ deposits as collateral, the banks as a whole would have
no collateral at all since effectively the ‘collateral’ would be lending to firms. Thus while an individual firm
deposit with another bank, on its own, could provide some collateral, the practice if allowed by a bank could
open the system, and so it too, to abuse. So it is plain that banks will not agree for bank deposits with other
banks to be collateral.
Consider second whether a deposit of a firm with its own bank could be collateral. We can see that this
is exactly equivalent to the firm holding M0 (which is then held for it by the bank). Imagine firms hold the
same part of their Net Worth as they held M0 before, but now in the form of deposits with their own banks;
it is agreed that this amount will not be invested but held as collateral. Lending then goes ahead in the
same amount as before but this part is held by the banks unlent, in a form that can be fully seized. To do
so the banks must hold M0 on their balance sheets, as this is the only asset that is fully seizable – just as
before when they held it on behalf of firms. In effect they invest the firms’ Net Worth in M0.
Thus in general we can think of M0 as the only available monetary collateral.
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the usual terms but lodging it with the banks via bank deposits created by its purchases of
government debt on the open market.
This now gives our monetary authorities three instruments: ξ, M0 and r. Accordingly
they will need three operating rules for these instruments. We will discuss these shortly.
First, we set out the balance sheets of the agents in the economy and discuss how they
are altered by acts of policy.
Firms Banks Households Govt/central bank
A L A L A L A L
( COLL− exM0−
COLL−M0+
K+
) (
NW
CR+
) (
CR+
) (
DEP+
) (
DEP+
GB−
) (
CUMSAV
) (
CUMDEF
) (
GB−
M0+
)
Table 1: Balance Sheets of the Agents of the Economy
Consider now how an open market operation (QE) by buying GB for M0 would change
these balance sheets – as indicated by + and − . Households place the extra cash on
deposit; the banks then lend it to firms who are able to use it as collateral in a future
lending deal with the banks, so that a larger part of collateral (COLL) is held as M0. With
collateral cheaper (δ falls) the bank credit premium falls, inducing a rise in investment and
leverage; the other collateral is thus disposed of so that the proceeds can be invested directly
in capital.
To adjust the model for these additional features, we need to introduce the effect of M0
on the credit premium via its effect on the cost of liquidating collateral, δ; and we need to
add ξ, the macro-prudential instrument directly raising the credit friction, into the credit
premium equation. This equation now has additional terms inm (=lnM0) and ξ, as follows:
Etcyt+1 − (rt − Etπt+1) = χ (qqt + kt − nt)− ψmt + ξt + eprt (6)
where ψ is the elasticity of the premium to M0 via its collateral role. This effect comes
about, conditional on leverage (k − n), through the willingness of banks (under their zero
profit condition) to reduce credit premium for given leverage. Now that they will recover
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more in the event of bankruptcy, the equilibrium contract, for given leverage, now has a
lower bankruptcy threshold and a lower required rate of return on firm assets. Both produce
a lower credit premium for given leverage.
We now need equations for the supply of M0 and for the setting of ξ. In China M0 seems
to have been set to moderate the growth of credit/broad money. We find a small negative
coefficient of M0 on the latter. We write the equation for M0 as:
∆mt = φ∆Mt + errm1t (7)
where Mt is money and we expect φ to be negative.
Macro-prudential measures have been built on the Basel Agreements nos 1 and 2; clearly
they have been made more harsh over this period in response to the crisis, which was un-
predicted by officials. Before that there was a gradual tightening of regulation at least in
the Agreements, if not always in practical application by individual countries. This sug-
gests that macro-prudential measures have evolved as an exogenous I(1) time-series process,
with the crisis acting as an exogenous shock to the process. We write the equation for the
macro-prudential instrument as:
∆ξt = errxit (8)
Given that we have very poor data on these macro-prudential measures we have to this point
simply included these in the error eprt.
Finally, we need an equation now additionally for the supply of money, which we define
as equal to deposits (= credit) +M0. Here we simply use the firms’ balance sheet (M =
CR+M0 = K + COLL−NW +M0) which can be written in loglinearised form as:
Mt = (1 + ν − c− µ)Kt + µmt − νnt
where M , K, m, n are respectively the logs of Money, capital, M0 and net worth, we have
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omitted the constant (which includes collateral, assumed fixed as a proportion of money);
ν, µ, c are respectively the ratios of net worth, M0 and collateral to money.9
3 DSGE, Banking and the Chinese Economy
It can be argued that the model, developed out of the Smets and Wouters (2003, 2007) is
only suitable for a large closed economy as characterised by the USA. It might be thought
that since China has a large export sector (26% of GDP) and a similarly large import sector,
it cannot be modelled as a closed economy. However, China’s export and import sector
has developed rapidly as a result of decisions to invest in new infrastructure in cities and
transportation; once these decisions were taken, the resulting output of goods was sold on
world markets at the prices needed to absorb it. Nevertheless as there is some degree of price
and wage rigidity in China, there will be effects of world demand in the short run. Because
the industrial structure is largely dominated by multi-national companies, imports too are
closely related to the export volumes. Thus we would argue that net imports can reasonably
be modelled as exogenous processes in China; this is how they enter in the Smets-Wouters
model, as an exogenous error process in the goods market-clearing equation whereby output
equals demand for goods.
An alternative argument is that the Chinese economy does not function fully as a devel-
oped market economy and that the modelling of the economy must include the distortions
of a dominant state sector (Zheng, Storesletten and Zilibotti, 2011) that stifles the growth
of private enterprise through state-capitalism (Huang, 2008) and distortions in the labour
market (Dollar and Jones, 2013) and a controlled banking system (Chen et al. 2012). While
there is merit in this argument, we argue that it misses the point of using a model as an an-
alytical aid to thinking about the determinants of the business cycle. In reality no economy
developed or otherwise behaves fully as the SW framework describes. The purpose of using
9Notice that in this model the demand for money is simply the demand for deposits as a savings vehicle.
Savings in the model are equal to investment by market-clearing, so that any additional investment requiring
additional bank supply of leverage is equal to the additional supply of savings.
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a DSGE model of a variant of the SW framework is to use it to isolate the principal factors
that drive the business cycle in China even with distorted markets.
Indeed DSGE models have been increasingly utilised in modelling the Chinese economy.
Zhang (2009) calibrate a DSGE model for China to examine welfare implications of a money
supply rule versus an interest rate rule. Mehrotra et al. (2013) use a partially estimated
(GMM) and calibrated DSGE model based on Christiano et al. (2005) to evaluate a re-
balancing of the Chinese economy from investment-led to consumption-led growth. The
labour market is assumed to be frictionless but rigidities arise from staggered price setting
by firms, habit formation in consumption and capital adjustment costs. Technology shocks
have a damped effect on output in a re-balanced economy. Wan and Xu (2010) use Bayesian
methods to estimate an open economy DSGE model based on Fernandez-Villaverde and
Rubio-Ramirez (2004). They find the standard result that technology shocks are the main
driver of the business cycle and that they dominate monetary shocks. Counter-cyclical credit
policy is examined by Peng (2012), in a New-Keynesian DSGE model based on Iacoviello
(2005). Firms are credit constrained and the Peoples Bank of China controls credit growth
through its hold on the banking system. While as expected, technology shocks dominate the
variance of output, credit shocks are also a strong driver. Counter-cyclical credit policy is
effective in reducing output volatility. In contrast, Sun and Sen (2012), develop a Bayesian
estimated modified Smets-Wouters DSGE model to examine the business cycle and find that
technology shocks play a subsidiary role. The dominant drivers of output are investment
and preference shocks.
A number of studies using the New Keynesian DSGE framework have been published by
Chinese scholars (in Chinese). Xu and Chen (2009) incorporate a bank lending channel into
a DSGE model with price stickiness. They find that technology shocks explain the majority
of the variations of output, investment and long-term consumption, and the fluctuations
of short-term consumption, loan and real money balance are mainly attributed to credit
shocks. Xi and He (2010) evaluate the welfare losses of China’s monetary policy with a
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New Keynesian DSGE model and find that the welfare losses are negatively correlated with
nominal interest rate-inflation sensitivity and positively correlated with nominal interest
rate-output sensitivity. They recommend using interest rate policy to stabilize the price level
but not to adjust economic growth rate. They also find that the welfare losses caused by
fluctuations in money supply are larger than caused by fluctuations in interest rate; hence the
appropriate intermediate target of monetary policy should be interest rate instead of money
supply. Yuan, Chen and Liu (2011) investigate the existence of the financial accelerator
within a small open economy. While the financial accelerator amplifies the impacts of shocks
to the marginal efficiency of investment and monetary policy, its amplification effect on
the technology and preference shocks is subsidiary. Similar results are reported in Liu and
Yuan (2012). Overall, the Chinese publications are in line with the results of those in the
international arena10.
The evolution of the Chinese banking system illustrates the broader evolution of its
capitalism with Chinese characteristics. Traditionally banking like the rest of the economy
has been dominated by the state: state-owned banks provide credit to state-owned firms. But
more recently the non-state owned banks have grown in parallel with the private production
sector. Because the state banks are closely supported by the government on favourable
terms, credit from them finds its way also to the private sector via a round-about route, to
the shadow banking system through the sale of wealth management products. Thus emerges
the peculiarly Chinese feature of two parallel systems, separate but connected. In our model
here we have treated the system as an integrated unit in which market forces work in a
similar, connected way – see LMMMX (2014) for details of the Chinese banking system
and monetary instruments.
It is clear that the Chinese banking system, state, non-state and shadow, is complex and
that its operations are intervened in by the government in many ways. Here we necessar-
ily abstract from these complexities partly because there is little relevant data and partly
10Among all existing DSGE modelling of Chinese economy, to our knowledge, only two have incorporated
a banking sector: Chen et al. (2012) and Xu and Chen (2009).
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because their interactions are hard to model. Instead we model it as if it behaves like an
ordinary banking system, facing idiosyncratic risk and costs of bankruptcy, the result of
which is a credit premium that rises with investment needs. Essentially one can think of
this as what the marginal investor in the private sector faces as the outcome of the banking
system in China.
4 The method of indirect inference
We evaluate the model’s capacity in fitting the data using the method of II originally proposed
in Minford, Theodoridis and Meenagh (2009) and subsequently with a number of refinements
by Le et al. (2011) who evaluate the method using Monte Carlo experiments. The approach
employs an auxiliary model that is completely independent of the theoretical one to produce
a description of the data against which the performance of the theory is evaluated indirectly.
Such a description can be summarised either by the estimated parameters of the auxiliary
model or by functions of these; we will call these the descriptors of the data. While these are
treated as the ‘reality’, the theoretical model being evaluated is simulated to find its implied
values for them.
II has been widely used in the estimation of structural models (e.g., Smith, 1993, Gregory
and Smith, 1991, 1993, Gourieroux et al., 1993, Gourieroux and Monfort, 1995 and Canova,
2005). Here we make a further use of indirect inference, to evaluate an already estimated
or calibrated structural model. The common element is the use of an auxiliary time series
model. In estimation the parameters of the structural model are chosen such that when this
model is simulated it generates estimates of the auxiliary model similar to those obtained
from the actual data. The optimal choices of parameters for the structural model are those
that minimise the distance between a given function of the two sets of estimated coefficients of
the auxiliary model. Common choices of this function are the actual coefficients, the scores
or the impulse response functions. In model evaluation the parameters of the structural
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model are taken as given. The aim is to compare the performance of the auxiliary model
estimated on simulated data derived from the given estimates of a structural model – which
is taken as a true model of the economy, the null hypothesis – with the performance of the
auxiliary model when estimated from the actual data. If the structural model is correct then
its predictions about the impulse responses, moments and time series properties of the data
should statistically match those based on the actual data. The comparison is based on the
distributions of the two sets of parameter estimates of the auxiliary model, or of functions
of these estimates.
The testing procedure thus involves first constructing the errors implied by the previously
estimated/calibrated structural model and the data. These are called the structural errors
and are backed out directly from the equations and the data11. These errors are then boot-
strapped and used to generate for each bootstrap new data based on the structural model.
An auxiliary time series model is then fitted to each set of data and the sampling distribution
of the coefficients of the auxiliary time series model is obtained from these estimates of the
auxiliary model. A Wald statistic is computed to determine whether functions of the para-
meters of the time series model estimated on the actual data lie in some confidence interval
implied by this sampling distribution.
Following Meenagh et al. (2012) we use as the auxiliary model a VECM which we
reexpress as a VAR(1) for the three macro variables (interest rate, output gap and inflation)
with a time trend and with the productivity residual entered as an exogenous non-stationary
process (these two elements having the effect of achieving cointegration)12. Thus our auxiliary
model in practice is given by:
yt = [I−K]yt−1+γxt−1+gt+vt where xt−1 is the stochastic trend in productivity, gt are
the deterministic trends, and vt are the VECM innovations. We treat as the descriptors of
11Some equations may involve calculation of expectations. The method we use here is the robust instrumen-
tal variables estimation suggested by McCallum (1976) and Wickens (1982): we set the lagged endogenous
data as instruments and calculate the fitted values from a VAR(1) – this also being the auxiliary model
chosen in what follows.
12See Le et al. (2013).
18
the data the VAR coefficients (on the endogenous variables only, I −K) and the VAR error
variances (var[v]). The Wald statistic is computed from these13. Thus effectively we are
testing whether the observed dynamics and volatility of the chosen variables are explained
by the simulated joint distribution of these at a given confidence level. The Wald statistic
is given by:
(Φ−Φ)′
∑−1
(ΦΦ)
(Φ− Φ) (9)
where Φ is the vector of VAR estimates of the chosen descriptors yielded in each simulation,
with Φ and
∑
(ΦΦ) representing the corresponding sample means and variance-covariance
matrix of these calculated across simulations, respectively.
The joint distribution of the Φ is obtained by bootstrapping the innovations implied by
the data and the theoretical model; it is therefore an estimate of the small sample distribu-
tion14. Such a distribution is generally more accurate for small samples than the asymptotic
distribution; it is also shown to be consistent by Le et al. (2011) given that the Wald statis-
tic is ‘asymptotically pivotal’; they also showed it had quite good accuracy in small sample
Monte Carlo experiments15.
This testing procedure is applied to a set of (structural) parameters put forward as the
true ones (H0, the null hypothesis); they can be derived from calibration, estimation, or both.
However derived, the test then asks: could these coefficients within this model structure be
the true (numerical) model generating the data? Of course only one true model with one
set of coefficients is possible. Nevertheless we may have chosen coefficients that are not
13We do not attempt to match the time trends and the coefficients on non-stationary trend productivity;
we assume that the model coefficients yielding these balanced growth paths and effects of trend productivity
on the steady state are chosen accurately. However, we are not interested for our exercise here in any effects
on the balanced growth path, as this is fixed. As for the effects of productivity shocks on the steady state
we assume that any inaccuracy in this will not importantly affect the business cycle analysis we are doing
here – any inaccuracy would be important in assessing the effect on the steady state which is not our focus.
Thus our assessment of the model is as if we were filtering the data into stationary form by regressing it on
the time trends and trend productivity.
14The bootstraps in our tests are all drawn as time vectors so contemporaneous correlations between the
innovations are preserved.
15Specifically, they found on stationary data that the bias due to bootstrapping was just over 2% at the
95% confidence level and 0.6% at the 99% level. Meenagh et al. (2012) found even greater accuracy in Monte
Carlo experiments on nonstationary data.
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exactly right numerically, so that the same model with other coefficient values could be
correct. Only when we have examined the model with all coefficient values that are feasible
within the model theory will we have properly tested it. For this reason we later extend our
procedure by a further search algorithm, in which we seek other coefficient sets that could
do better in the test.
Thus we calculate the minimum-value full Wald statistic for each period using a powerful
algorithm based on Simulated Annealing (SA) in which search takes place over a wide range
around the initial values, with optimising search accompanied by random jumps around
the space16. In effect this is Indirect Inference estimation of the model; however here this
estimation is being done to find whether the model can be rejected in itself and not for
the sake of finding the most satisfactory estimates of the model parameters. Nevertheless
of course the method does this latter task as a by-product so that we can use the resulting
unrejected model as representing the best available estimated version. The merit of this
extended procedure is that we are comparing the best possible versions of each model type
when finally doing our comparison of model compatibility with the data.
Before we proceed to carry out our tests and estimation, we should explain why we do
not use the much more familiar ‘direct inference’ estimation and testing procedures here. In
direct inference one fits a structural model directly to the data, either by classical ‘frequentist’
FIML or by the now popular Bayesian ML. The likelihood that is maximised in FIML is
derived from the size of the reduced form errors. In Bayesian ML it is derived from this plus
the priors – effectively the resulting ML parameters are a weighted average of the FIML
values and the priors, where the weights depend on the prior distributions and the extent to
16We use a Simulated Annealing algorithm due to Ingber (1996). This mimics the behaviour of the steel
cooling process in which steel is cooled, with a degree of reheating at randomly chosen moments in the
cooling process – this ensuring that the defects are minimised globally. Similarly the algorithm searches in
the chosen range and as points that improve the objective are found it also accepts points that do not improve
the objective. This helps to stop the algorithm being caught in local minima. We find this algorithm improves
substantially here on a standard optimisation algorithm. Our method used our standard testing method:
we take a set of model parameters (excluding error processes), extract the resulting residuals from the data
using the LIML method, find their implied autoregressive coefficients (AR(1) here) and then bootstrap the
implied innovations with this full set of parameters to find the implied Wald value. This is then minimised
by the SA algorithm.
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which the FIML values differ from the priors. The FIML values are essentially those that
give the best current forecasting performance for the model (i.e. minimising the size of the
reduced form errors). One can develop overall tests of the model specification under direct
inference by creating, in the FIML case, a Likelihood Ratio against some benchmark model,
a natural one being an unrestricted VAR; in the Bayesian case Del Negro and Schorfheide
have proposed the DSGE-VAR weight as a measure of model closeness to the data (this is
the weight on the prior model’s implied VAR, as combined with the unrestricted VAR, that
maximises the likelihood). This can also be treated as a specification test of the overall
model, even though usually Bayesians are reluctant to talk about ‘testing’ the model as
whole.
Such tests are compared with the indirect inference tests using Monte Carlo experiments
with an SW model, in Le et al. (2014).They find that the tests compare quite different
features of model performance. The direct ones check (in-sample) forecasting ability, while
the indirect one checks the model’s causal structure. For policy purposes we are most
interested in using DSGE models for simulation of the effects of policy changes and hence
in their causal structure. Typically forecasting is done by other means.
Both tests can still be used to test a model’s specification and hence its causal structure,
even if the direct method checks it via forecasting performance. But Le et al. also find that,
viewed as test of model specification, the power of direct inference tests in small samples is
much lower than that of indirect inference. In other words they discriminate rather weakly
against false models. This is presumably because forecasting is only weakly related to good
specification; bad models with a lot of ad hoc lags and added exogenous variables forecast
better than models based on good theory, which are restricted to having only structural
shock processes as their exogenous variables. Furthermore false models will generate false
structural shock processes which may well partly compensate for the specification error in the
model’s forecasting performance. Meanwhile the indirect inference test’s power against false
models allows one to discover rather accurately what features of the data behaviour a model
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can replicate and what not; this in turn can be helpful in thinking about respecification.
In estimation both FIML and Indirect estimators are consistent and asymptotically nor-
mal. But as we have seen the latter’s power is greater in small samples so that it should also
give more reliable results from estimation in small samples. For these reasons we use the
indirect inference procedure here both to estimate the model on our available small samples
and to test its specification.
5 Model decomposition and the origins of the banking
crisis
5.1 Estimation and model fit
The model that integrates the banking sector and money is estimated using the method of
II as set out in Le et al. (2011) for the 1991—2011 period. The estimated model is tested
against the data using the main macroeconomic variables, output, inflation and the interest
rate. We use a test of whether the model can match the time series properties of the data
jointly. The model is found to fit the data well according to the Wald statistic with a p-value
of 0.0901. The estimated parameters can be found in Table 2. Impulse response functions to
key variables when the model is applied to non-stationary data are shown in Figure 2. Note
that the second set of IRFs in Figure 2 are due to a non-stationary productivity shock. Figure
3 shows that the model generates 95% confidence intervals for the implied VAR responses
that easily encompasses the data-based VAR responses to a monetary shock – see Appendix
2 for the VAR responses to other shocks.
Table 2 presents four columns of parameter estimates. The first column is for the US
economy by Le, Meenagh and Minford (2012a) and the second column shows the same model
for China. The comparison reveals that in China the competitive structure of labour and
product markets is more competitive than that in the US; about 64% of the labour market
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is imperfectly competitive but 93% of the product market is competitive. In the imperfectly
competitive labour market wages are less rigid in China and there is less wage indexation.
Chinese labour supply is about twice as responsive to real wages as in the US. In China
there is about a third less habit persistence in consumption. Capital adjustment costs are
about twice as great and it is four times as costly to vary capacity utilisation. In money and
banking the response of the credit spread to Tobin’s Q is twice as large; and the Taylor Rule is
roughly twice as responsive both to inflation and output gaps, and has similar persistence. If
one had to place China along the New Keynesian-New Classical spectrum it would therefore
be closer to the New Classical end, with less nominal rigidity. This should mean that in
response to a similar-sized shock prices are more volatile than in the US. This is what we
find in for example the IRF to a monetary contraction; inflation falls about three times as
much as it does for an equivalent shock in the US. The third column of parameters is for
the modified model that incorporates the banking sector with the money supply added as
discussed above.
When we turn to the comparison of the China model with money supply added, we can
see that its coefficients are little different from those of the previous China model. The
difference comes basically through the substitution of M0-based collateral in place of net
worth. The feedback coefficient on M0 from the credit/money supply is set very small in
estimation because otherwise it tends to destabilise the model.
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Figure 2: IRFs for key variables
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Model Coefficients: 1991Q1-2011Q4
Est US Est China
Est China
+ money
Steady-state elasticity
of capital adjustment
ϕ 7.5744 4.0445 4.2960
Elasticity of consumption σc 1.2716 1.3329 1.4676
External habit formation λ 0.6512 0.4718 0.4423
Probability of not changing
wages
ξw 0.7533 0.6034 0.6691
Elasticity of labour supply σL 2.8327 1.3139 1.4569
Probability of not changing
prices
ξp 0.8398 0.8417 0.8835
Wage indexation ιw 0.9404 0.6163 0.6934
Price indexation ιp 0.1213 0.1648 0.1558
Elasticity of capital utilisation ψ 0.1988 0.5308 0.4922
Share of fixed costs in
production (+1)
Φ 1.6841 1.6211 1.4468
Taylor Rule response
to inflation
rp 1.8886 2.6671 2.9436
Interest rate smoothing ρ 0.7742 0.7680 0.7716
Taylor Rule response
to output
ry 0.0381 0.1001 0.0917
Taylor Rule response
to change in output
r∆y 0.1133 0.1466 0.1618
Share of capital in production α 0.1435 0.1832 0.1647
Proportion of sticky wages ωw 0.5624 0.6376 0.6930
Proportion of sticky prices ωr 0.0874 0.0708 0.0607
Elasticity of the premium
with respect to leverage
χ 0.0279 0.0554 0.0619
Quarterly steady-state inflation† π¯ 0.7800 0.7800 0.7800
Discount factor† β 0.9984 0.9984 0.9984
Steady-state hours worked† L 0.5300 0.5300 0.5300
Quarterly steady-state
output growth†
γ¯ 0.4300 0.4300 0.4300
Ratio of M0 to credit ν 0.0731
Ratio of net worth to credit µ 0.2459
M0 response
to broad money
φ −0.0607
Elasticity of the
premium to M0
φ1 −0.0668
WALD (Y, π,R) 20.9734 19.6967 20.4425
†Fixed parameters p-value 0.0736 0.1084 0.0901
Table 2: Coefficient Estimates (1984Q3-2009Q2)
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Figure 3: VAR IRFs for a monetary shock
5.2 Error properties on unfiltered data
Having established that the model that integrates the banking sector and money is not
rejected by the data, we now go on to apply it to the recent crisis episode in China. To do
this we extract the model shocks from the unfiltered data and fit to each an AR time-series
process over the period. Table 3 shows the status of each shock and also the AR parameters
that emerge from the estimation process. We find that productivity unambiguously has a unit
root and we specify it in first differences. The other shocks we treat as either stationary or
trend-stationary, because theoretically the model implies that they should be; for example
‘government spending’ (which includes net exports) is bounded by taxable capacity/the
balance of payments, and the credit spread by collateral and limits on Tobin’s Q. We then
allow the error data to determine the AR parameters, with the results reported in this Table.
Even though the AR coefficients do not closely approach the unit root, many of them show
high persistence. Though the ADF and KPSS tests are consistent in several cases with unit
roots, the fact that the model as a whole fits the data behaviour with the AR coefficients
used here is evidence in their favour; had unit roots given a better fit, we would observe AR
coefficients negligibly different from unity.
Clearly the crisis had international ramifications but we cannot identify the causality
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ADF KPSS Conclusion Coefficient
p-value+ statistic AR
Exogenous Demand 0.2317 0.2817∗∗∗ Trend Stationary‡ 0.8369
Preferences 0.0019 0.1413 Stationary 0.6422
Private Investment 0.3275 0.5026∗∗ Stationary‡ 0.8806
Taylor Rule 0.0458 0.7030∗∗ Stationary‡ 0.6665
Productivity 0.9964 1.2011∗∗∗ Nonstationary −0.4237
Price Mark-up 0.0132 0.1814 Stationary 0.1912
Wage Mark-up 0.0000 0.4311 Stationary 0.3203
Labour Supply 0.6326 0.1537∗∗ Trend Stationary‡ 0.9219
Premium 0.0402 0.1717∗∗ Trend Stationary‡ 0.8428
Net Worth 0.0002 0.4837 Stationary 0.4660
M0 0.0170 0.0573 Stationary 0.7496
+ p-value of 0.05 is the 5% confidence limit for rejecting the unit root.
∗∗(∗∗∗) KPSS rejects stationarity at 5%(1%).
‡ After detrending the series are stationary with a AR coefficient less than 1
Table 3: Stationarity of Shocks and AR Parameters
of these in a China-only model. The shocks that show up in the model are partly coming
from these international effects. Thus commodity price shocks that enter through the ‘price
mark-up’ here are themselves responding to the crisis. Also the exogenous demand shock,
which consists of government spending and net exports, contains the international downturn
in world trade.
A further, similar limitation of our account is our inability to analyse connections between
the shocks to the model. No doubt the banking shocks we identify had simultaneous and
lagged effects on the non-banking shocks; but also vice versa, the non-banking on the banking.
The sample episode is too short to establish which way such effects might go or even if they
exist, tempting as it might be to run some regressions to detect them. The model assumes
that each shock is separate from the others and only related to its own past. The model then
disentangles how each shock works through the economy to affect final outcomes. Anyone
that wished to take matters further would have to model the interactions of the shocks
themselves through a wider model, such as one of political economy.
26
5.3 The errors driving the episode
We begin by showing the behaviour of the main model errors (i.e. the total cumulated
innovations) during the crisis episode, which we treat as 2006Q1 to 2011Q4.
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Figure 4: Accumulated Shocks from 2006Q1—2011Q4
We can see from Figure 4 that there was turbulence over the crisis in many of these shocks.
We can single out ones where this was greatest. Exogenous demand shows the collapse of
world trade at the end of 2008. There are parallel falls in consumption and investment.
The price mark-up fluctuated with world commodity price movements. The Taylor Rule
error appears to be associated with these and with world trade movements; there was no
zero bound problem in China such as we find in the US as both interest rates and inflation
remained fairly high during the episode.
Productivity fell after the crisis hit17; and the labour supply error (a measure of ‘wage
push’ from workers) rose and then fell as workers responded to the crisis by cutting wages
unusually.
Finally there is a strong shock coming via M0, which fell sharply during the crisis but
17Jian et al. (2010) use a standard sticky-price DSGE, to identify the effects of oil price shocks on
productivity. They confirm that oil price shocks have permanent negative effects on output.
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was then greatly boosted during 2009 by Bank policy.
Overall, we can see that there was a wide set of shocks hitting the Chinese economy
during the crisis period, the major ones coming from abroad but in turn triggering domestic
counterpart shocks. The Chinese authorities’ response was, as we know, to give orders to
banks to lend for investment projects, mainly infrastructure. We can see this response in
the investment error, which turns sharply positive from the end of 2009. We can also see a
strong reaction to the crisis in government spending which with net exports constitutes the
exogenous demand shock; this is revealed by the available annual data shown in Figure 5
(there is quarterly data only for the two combined).
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Figure 5: Government Spending and Net Exports (%GDP)
5.4 A stochastic variance decomposition of the episode
We next look at the variance decomposition of such episodes. Again, we are using unfiltered
data when performing this analysis which treats the episode stochastically – that is, we take
the shocks in the episode and replay them by redrawing them randomly and repeatedly with
replacement to see what a typical crisis episode would be like. Our variance decomposition
is therefore for such a typical episode.
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Int. rate Inv. Inf. Real Wages Cons. Output Emp.
Exogenous
Demand
17.6 0.1 1.1 1.1 6.0 13.5 17.0
Preferences 27.5 0.3 5.0 15.1 14.2 7.2 6.4
Investment 1.8 1.9 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.2
Taylor Rule 2.1 2.5 54.0 49.1 25.1 26.9 23.0
Productivity 0.6 0.3 3.3 7.2 18.3 10.7 21.3
Price
Mark-up
15.4 0.6 31.9 16.8 5.9 6.5 5.2
Wage
Mark-up
0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0
Labour
Supply
2.8 0.7 2.8 4.3 18.5 11.8 16.0
Premium 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
Net Worth 12.8 32.9 0.6 2.1 4.8 9.2 4.6
M0 18.8 60.2 1.0 3.3 6.5 13.5 5.9
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Banking
Shocks
32.1 93.7 1.7 5.5 11.4 22.9 10.6
Non-Banking
Shocks
67.9 6.3 98.3 94.5 88.6 77.1 89.4
Table 4: Variance Decomposition for Crisis Period
What we see from Table 4 is that only 23% of the output variance is due to financial shocks
(here essentially the M0 shock18); and the rest is due to the usual non-banking shocks. The
M0 shock operates by disturbing the supply of credit and so investment; thus for investment
the share of financial shocks is very high (94%); but this gets dampened in its effect on GDP
because interest rates react to them. Accordingly we see that interest rates are also quite
highly affected (32%) by the financial shocks.
Thus there is a distinct role for financial shocks in such Chinese episodes. However,
the bulk of the variation comes from the other shocks: exogenous demand, labour supply,
productivity, monetary policy and the price mark-up.
18It may seem strange to include the M0 error among financial/banking shocks when its rise at the end of
the period reflects a strong policy response. However, in this is parallels the behaviour of the credit premium
shock in the US which was clearly a financial shock but also later embodied a strong policy response in the
form of bank bailout. In China the credit premium shock was small because the banks are largely state
banks with little perceived credit risk.
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5.5 Accounting for this particular banking crisis episode
We can also decompose what actually happened in the precise episode that occurred accord-
ing to the model as a result of these shocks. We do this in the charts that follow for the
main macro variables.
If we focus first on output (Figure 6), we see that the economy overall contracts about
8% due to the crisis between the peak in 2008 and the trough in 2009. There are two main
elements in this: exogenous demand and Taylor Rule tightening. It may seem surprising
that tightening money reinforced the crisis downturn, but to understand this one must turn
to the inflation chart (Figure 7, in % per quarter) which shows the inflation upsurge just
prior to the Lehman collapse; the upward swing in inflation by mid-2008 from 2006 was 8%
per annum. This would have fuelled alarm in the central bank over and above the normal
counter-inflation response in the Taylor Rule. Accordingly we see that the main drivers of
the inflation fluctuations are the price mark-up and the Taylor Rule shocks.
Thus when we turn to interest rates (Figure 8), we see that they do decline after Lehman
but not as fast as one might expect. They remain surprisingly flat until the middle of
2009 when finally they plunge, assisted by the collapse of the price mark-up with falling
commodity prices. Interest rates are affected by most of the shocks to some degree.
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Figure 6: Shock decomposition for output for the period 2006-2011
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Figure 7: Shock decomposition for inflation for the period 2006-2011
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Figure 8: Shock decomposition for interest rate for the period 2006-2011
The overall interpretation coming from this analysis is of a crisis in China triggered by a
large exogenous demand shock, mainly external, and by large shocks to inflation from world
commodity prices; these in turn probably triggered the sharp monetary policy shocks which
also contributed. Financial shocks seem to have played a modest part in the swings at the
heart of the crisis period, though they did contribute to general variation over the whole
period. Notice that this is not a crisis ‘created by the (Chinese) financial system’19.
19Chinese banks had only a limited exposure to the sub-prime market. The Bank of China, ICBC and
China Construction Bank together held RMB11.9bn in sub-price mortgage backed securities and CDOs.
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5.6 What is and what causes a (financial) crisis in China?
If we take a longer perspective than just this crisis, we can ask: what is the nature of a
crisis in China and what causes it, according to our analysis of this sample? Let us define
a ‘crisis’ as a severe interruption in output growth, a large part of which is permanent; and
a financial crisis as a crisis in which there is also a financial collapse of some sort. What
does this model have to say in general about the causes of these? We examine this question
by inspecting the bootstrap experience (potential scenarios over the period) from the model
and its normal shocks; for this we use the shocks from the period 1991—2007 so that we do
not reuse the shocks from this crisis period itself. Again, this analysis is done on unfiltered
data. Plainly we know that these shocks generate crisis; and we want to discover whether
this experience is unique. We also look at the full period including the crisis, 1991—2011; as
it turns out the two periods are not that different, because China’s crisis was not particularly
severe.
We find the following regularities:
a) Crisis is a normal part of Chinese capitalism: this economy will generate crises regularly
from ‘standard’ shock sequences. In Figures 9 and 10 we illustrate this from some of the
bootstrap simulations/scenarios produced from the shocks of the 1991—2007 period (i.e. sans
crisis). In around one third of them there were quite serious interruptions of activity, which
satisfy the definition of crisis. If we define a crisis as an interruption of GDP growth such
that output falls and does not recover to its past peak for at least 3 years (which for a China
accustomed to regular 7% plus growth is a severe interruption), then we find that a crisis
on average will occur about every 47 years; this figure does not change materially when the
period is extended to include the crisis period, i.e. 1991—2011. This reflects the fact that
shocks during the crisis period were not as large as for some earlier periods.
Clearly these figures are affected by the nature of the sample shocks; here we have used
the experience of the last two decades, which apart from the crisis itself was the period of
the Great Moderation in the world economy. As we know that the variance of shocks in this
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period was markedly lower than in earlier post-war history, extending our sample backwards
in time would no doubt change our estimates in detail.
b) When there is a crisis, about 41% of the time there is also a financial crisis; we
measure this here by the appearance of an abnormal premium rise accompanying a crisis
fall in output. This is shown for the same scenarios by showing the corresponding external
premium behaviour.
c) A financial shock is not sufficient to produce a crisis. To check this point we redid
these scenarios with just the three financial shocks including the crisis period values; thus
this shock series includes both normal and extreme financial shocks. If financial crisis can
be the result of extreme financial shocks, we should obtain a few at least. However what we
find is that even though our financial shock series is effectively non-stationary it does not
cause a crisis; we obtained none by our measure above.
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Figure 9: Crises Not Accompanied by Financial Crisis
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Figure 10: Crises Accompanied by Financial Crisis
6 Policy Reforms
During the crisis the Chinese government used both a direct fiscal response in the form of
higher government spending and a credit-direction response in which banks were directed
to lend for investment. While the fiscal response was effective and when we simulated it in
repeated samples caused a dampening of output fluctuations, the credit/investment response
caused dangerous instability in the form of rising excess capacity– this was the major finding
of LMMMX (2014). We now look, using our model with both money and credit, at whether
the Chinese authorities could have made more effective use of monetary policy to dampen
the crisis.
The model endows the authorities with two instruments, apart from regulation which
we leave on one side as a last resort, given the distortionary impacts that it has. These
instruments are M0 (Quantitative Easing, OpenMarket Operations) and interest-rate setting
via a Taylor Rule. We assume in this model that the instruments can be independently
chosen. Open market operations supply M0 in exchange for government onds of all types,
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so setting the credit premium by affecting the supply of collateral. Interest rates are set by
selling or buying short government bonds for long.
As we have seen the Chinese economy according to our model is capable of generating
frequent crises in the absence of policy feedback – about one every half-century on aver-
age. From the point of view of maintaining consensus behind the government’s policies for
growth and market liberalisation the avoidance of crisis is of key importance, as clearly re-
vealed in the Chinese government’s strong response to the financial crisis. Thus an average
frequency of crisis of this order, implying a good chance of more frequent occurrence, is
plainly unacceptable to Chinese policymakers.
6.1 Changes in the monetary regime
The Great Recession showed that an economy with inflation targeting alone struggled to
cope with big shocks to the economy and might even contribute to instability (Beckworth,
2014) because monetary policy was too tight (and may have been too loose in the boom
that led up to it). In this section, we discuss some possible changes to the monetary regime
that could improve economic stability, compared with the baseline regime (embedded in the
model) of inflation targeting, minimal regulation and an accommodative M0 response to
the money supply. Our focus with these alternative regimes is their capacity to reduce the
number of crises.
6.1.1 Monetary reform
One of the features of the run-up to the Great Recession was a substantial expansion of
money and credit, permitted by the inflation targeting regime. This came about because
inflation did not respond much to this expansion, anchored as it was by expectations that
the inflation target would be effective. Yet since monetary expansion has a stimulative effect
on the economy, supplementing the interest rate rule with a money supply rule could be
helpful to stability. We now investigate how a monetary reform regime of this type might
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work. Here we supplement the Taylor Rule with a powerful M0 rule responding strongly to
the output gap.
The optimal monetary reform takes the following form
∆mt = 100
(
yt−1 − y
∗
t−1
)
(10)
To measure its effect in stabilising the economy we perform a large number of bootstrap
simulations over the sample period and compute the average frequency of crisis as defined
above, namely a drop in output where output does not recover to its previous peak for 3
years. This M0 rule brings down the frequency of crisis per 1000 years from 16.9 (a crisis
on average every 48 years) in the baseline case to 2.2 (one on average every 450 years) (see
Table 5).20
Base
case
Monetary
Reform
PLT NGDPT
Frequency of crisis
(crises per 1000 years)
16.9 2.2 1.2 3.0
Table 5: Frequency of crisis and stability under different monetary regimes
6.1.2 Price-level targeting regime
The zero lower bound situation in most developed economies and the recession associated
with it has renewed interest in price level targeting (PLT) as a better alternative monetary
policy that can achieve price stability while also reducing the impact of the zero lower
bound (Wolman, 2005; Vestin, 2006; Nakov, 2008; and Dib et al, 2008; for a recent survey
see Hatcher and Minford, 2013). Under PLT, inflation expectations adjust to stabilise the
economy: if an unanticipated shock pushes the price level below the target, people will
expect higher than average inflation in the future to bring the price level back to the target.
20The coefficient in the M0 rule is 100, which may seem high. Nevertheless it needs to be seen in the
context of the experience of Quantitative Easing in the recent crisis, such as in the US and the UK, where
the monetary base was expanded by large multiples (around 8-fold in the case of the UK) in order to stimulate
financial recovery.
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PLT has two advantages over inflation targeting. First, due to the automatic adjustment
in inflation expectations, the central bank does not need to move interest rates aggressively
in response to shocks (Cover and Pecorino, 2005), thus it reduces the likelihood of hitting
the zero bound. Second, PLT can generate positive inflation expectations in a deflationary
situation, lowering real interest rates even at the zero bound and so stengthen recovery.
While China has not experienced a zero bound, similar mechanisms work outside the zero
bound: when the economy grows strongly pushing up the price level, inflation expectations
fall sharply, so powerfully raising real interest rates; and when the econoy is weak, pushing
prices down, inflation expectations rise sharply, lowering real interest rates and promoting
recovery.
The PLT rule is specified as follows:
rt = ρ1rt−1 + (1− ρ1)
{
ρπ (pt − p) + ρy(yt − y
∗)
}
+ ρ∆y [(yt − y
∗)− (yt−1 − y
∗)] + ert (11)
Under the zero inflation steady state, the steady state price level is assumed constant here
and normalised as p = 0.
We are looking for an optimal PLT specification that provides the least frequency of crisis
under our bootstrap simulations. The following PLT
rt = 0.99rt−1 + (1− 0.99) {1.027pt + 0.963(yt − y
∗)}+ 0.857 (yt − yt−1) + ert (12)
reduces crisis frequency per 1000 years to 1.2 from the baseline 16.9 (Table 5).
6.1.3 Nominal GDP targeting
A group known as Market Monetarists who run a widely-accessed blog on monetary policy,
have been calling for monetary policy to target the level of nominal GDP (NGDP), rather
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than either a monetary aggregate or inflation (Sumner 2011, Nunes and Cole 2013). A similar
proposal was made some time ago in a series of papers by McCallum (1988) and McCallum
and Nelson (1999) who suggested a rule setting interest rates in response to deviations of
nominal GDP growth from a target rate. McCallum argued that this rule would be superior
to monetary targeting because of the large and unpredictable changes in payments technology
and financial regulations. Compared with the later Taylor Rule McCallum’s rule has interest
rates responding as strongly to output growth deviations as to inflation deviations. However,
Market Monetarists argue for targeting the level of NGDP rather than its growth rate; the
reasons are similar to those for PLT, except that in this case a expected future interest rate
stimulus is triggered also by output falling below its trend (McCallum, 2011). A concern
about this is that with a stochastic productivity trend monetary policy would be affected by
permanent shifts in productivity; thus the NGDP rule we use here allows for changes in the
model’s productivity trend – since this is hard for the central bank to estimate, the results
for the NGDP rule shown here are ‘best case’. Nevertheless, if this best case can be assumed,
the NGDP rule generates expectations of very strong monetary responses in conditions of
prolonged recession – analogous to Roosevelt’s 1930s abandonment of the Gold Standard
(Carney, 2012 and Woodford, 2012).
Implementing the NGDP target, the central bank would specify an intermediate target
for the official interest rate. The rule might be written as follows:
rt = ρ1rt−1 + ρy(yt + pt − yt − p) + ert (13)
where y+p is the target for NGDP, where p = 0 and yt follows the trend path in real output
generated by productivity.
Given this general rule, we bootstrap our model and implied shocks to see whether
implementing the NGDP targeting regime could help to stabilise the economy. We found
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that the rule in of form of
rt = 0.309rt−1 + 0.990(pt + yt − yt) + ert (14)
also dramatically reduces the frequency of crisis from the baselibne 16.9 per 1000 years to 3
(Table 5).
We give two examples below in Figures 11 and 12 of simulated samples over the period
in which there were substantial crisis in the baseline; the figures show how the three rules
would have smoothed out real GDP. It can be seen clearly how powerful the rules are even
in these two volatile episodes.
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Figure 11: Simulated output under different rules (example 1)
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Figure 12: Simulated output under different rules (example 2)
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What we see from implementing these reforms either to the Taylor Rule or to the M0
reaction function is that they are capable of reducing the frequency of crises to negligi-
ble levels. Our illustrative bootstrap samples reveal that they smooth output fluctuations
markedly, both moderating the boom and counteracting the slump. By doing so they also
effectively eliminate financial crises also, since as we have seen these have their entire origin
in macroeconomic fluctuations due to real shocks. There is therefore no need for the author-
ities to use heavy-handed and distortionary regulative controls on banks to avoid financial
crisis. Of course financial shocks will occur but as we have seen these alone are incapable
of producing financial crisis; we can regard these as requiring simply and on occasion the
normal central bank response of lender of last resort.
7 Conclusions
This paper presents the results of an investigation into the behaviour of the Chinese economy
over the period of the recent crisis with the aid of the well-known Smets-Wouters DSGE
model, as modified by Le et al. (2011) to allow for greater heterogeneity in price/wage
behaviour and including the banking/financial accelerator model of Bernanke et al. (1999).
Furthermore, we have modified the BGG model to allow for the role of money, replacing net
worth as collateral with the firm’s holding of cash (M0) and the cash-conversion. A value of
its capital stock. This allows the model to generate monetary behaviour.
The method of indirect inference was used to estimate the model which was then used
to carry out an accounting exercise in the shocks causing the crisis episode. The estimation
was done on unfiltered data, allowing for non-stationary shocks. The model was not rejected
by the data and a variance decomposition was conducted to establish what a typical crisis
generated by these shocks if redrawn randomly would be caused by. The decomposition
focussed specifically on the crisis period. A variety of simulations bootstrapped from different
sets of the shocks in the sample (over the last three decades, on the grounds that this is of
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most relevance today) was conducted to shed light on the causes of crisis and the banking
crisis in particular. The conclusion of the exercise is perhaps not very surprising: the crisis
in China was not a crisis in the conventional sense, in that it was a growth slowdown rather
than a precipitous drop in output as in the rest of the world. The cause was mainly the result
of external shocks from world trade and commodity prices, which in turn triggered responses
from the Chinese authorities in the form of monetary policy shocks and shocks to investment
(via targeted loans from state banks). Banking shocks as identified by the model played only
a minor role in the main crisis period of 2008—9 though they added to fluctuations over the
whole period to date. Thus the crisis in China was not a crisis of Chinese banking, as is well
known.
The model also tells us that crises are regular occurrences in capitalist economies, such
as China now is moving towards, and that they frequently will have as their by-product
financial crisis in the sense that the premium rises sharply. These crises will occur in spite
of there being no extreme financial shocks such as occurred in the recent episode; so serious
financial shocks are not required for crises to happen. Furthermore, extreme financial shocks
on their own of the type identified in this sample do not cause crises; all they do is cause
temporary recessions. Thus both crises and financial crises result from non-financial shocks;
naturally financial shocks if extreme enough will add an extra layer of recession.
We built on the results of an earlier paper where we found that the Chinese government’s
response to the crisis in the form of mandated credit provision across the economy risked
generating severe excess capacity and consequent instability. In this paper we looked at
alternative monetary responses to those in the prevailing regime. We found that a strong
M0 reponse to the output gap, or an interest rate rule with either a price level target or a
nominal GDP target would have greatly stabilised the Chinese economy, reducing crises to
a minimum.
The policy conclusion of this paper is that regulative responses to the instability of the
economy, money and credit are mis-placed because they cause market distortions and are
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also unnecessary, since monetary policy can do the job, if properly calibrated. This echoes
the policy conclusion of Le et al. (2014) for the US. In this respect, as in many others, the
behaviour of the Chinese economy does not appear to be qualitatively different from that of
the US economy.
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8 Appendix 1: Model Listing
Consumption Euler equation
ct =
λ
γ
1 + λ
γ
ct−1+
1
1 + λ
γ
Etct+1+
(σc − 1)
W∗L∗
C∗(
1 + λ
γ
)
σc
(lt − Etlt+1)−

 1− λγ(
1 + λ
γ
)
σc

 (rt −Etpt+1)+ebt
(15)
Investment Euler equation
innt =
1
1 + βγ(1−σc)
innt−1 +
βγ(1−σc)
1 + βγ(1−σc)
Etinnt+1 +
1
(1 + βγ(1−σc)) γ2ϕ
qqt + einnt (16)
Tobin Q equation
qqt =
1− δ
1− δ +RK∗
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RK∗
1− δ +RK∗
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Capital Accumulation equation
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γ
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(
1−
1− δ
γ
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γ
)(
1 + βγ(1−σc)
) (
γ2
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(ϕ) (einnt) (18)
Price Setting equation
rkt = ω
r
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ιP
1+βγ(1−σc)ιP
pt−1 +
(
1
1+βγ(1−σc)ιP
)
(
(1−βγ(1−σc)ξp)(1−ξp)
ξp((φp−1)ǫp+1)
)
((1− α)wt − eat)− ept




+(1− ωr)
[
eat
α
−
1− α
α
wt
]
(19)
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Wage Setting equation
wt = ω
w


βγ(1−σc)
1+βγ(1−σc)
Etwt+1 +
1
1+βγ(1−σc)
wt−1 +
βγ(1−σc)
1+βγ(1−σc)
Etpt+1 −
1+βγ(1−σc)ιw
1+βγ(1−σc)
pt
+ ιw
1+βγ(1−σc)
pt−1 −
1
1+βγ(1−σc)
(
(1−βγ(1−σc)ξw)(1−ξw)
(1+ǫw(φw−1))ξw
)
(
wt − σllt −
(
1
1−λ
γ
)(
ct −
λ
γ
ct−1
))
+ ewt

+
(1− ωw)
[
σllt +
(
1
1−λ
γ
)(
ct −
λ
γ
ct−1
)
− (πt − Et−1πt) + ew
S
t
]
(20)
Labour demand
lt = −wt +
(
1 +
1− ψ
ψ
)
rkt + kt−1 (21)
Market Clearing condition in goods market
yt =
C
Y
ct +
I
Y
innt +R
K
∗ ky
1− ψ
ψ
rkt + c
e
yc
e
t + egt (22)
Aggregate Production equation
yt = φ
[
α
1− ψ
ψ
rkt + αkt−1 + (1− α) lt + eat
]
(23)
Taylor Rule
rt = ρrt−1 + (1− ρ) (rppt + ryyt) + r∆y (yt − yt−1) + ert (24)
Premium
Etcyt+1 − (rt −Etpt+1) = χ (qqt + kt − nt) + φ1mt + eprt (25)
Net worth
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nt =
K
N
(cyt −Et−1cyt) + Et−1cyt + θnt−1 + enwt (26)
Entrepreneurial consumption
cet = nt (27)
M0
mt = mt−1 + φ (Mt −Mt−1) + emt (28)
M2
Mt = (1 + ν − µ)kt + µmt − νnt (29)
8.1 Augmenting the BGG model for collateral and money
The assumptions added to BGG are that the banks demand collateral as a proportion of
net worth of c; and that liquidating this collateral costs δ per unit of collateral. The BGG
model consists of three parts:
a) a bankruptcy threshold at which firms will choose to default
b) banks’ zero profit condition (free entry drives profits to zero) – this condition gives
us the banks’ leverage offer curve.
c) firms’ maximisation of utility subject to a) and b); this gives us the overall contract.
a) the bankruptcy threshold (ω; ω is the return obtained per unit of assets, distributed
as a random variable with a mean of unity): this is such that the firm is indifferent between
defaulting and staying in business. If it goes bankrupt, it loses (1 + RK)ωA + cN and it
gains ZB. Here Z=1+credit rate and B= bank borrowing; A is total investment, RK =
the firms’ return on investment, and N= net worth of the firm. Thus at the threshold
ZB = (1 +RK)ωA+ cN . Note also that the firms’ balance sheet is B = A−N + cN ; thus
when this condition holds:(1 + RK)ωA+ cN = Z(A −N + cN). Let L = A/N= Leverage.
Divide the condition by N and obtain: Z = (1+R
K)ωL+c
L−1+c
b) banks’ zero profit condition is given by
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[1− F (ω)]ZB + (1− µ)G(ω)(1 +RK)A+ cNF (ω)(1− δ) = (1 +R)B
On the left hand side the first term is the probability of obtaining the loan proceeds (ZB),
where F (ω) is the probability of going bankrupt. In the second term G(ω) is the expected
value of the returns per unit asset to be made if the firm goes bankrupt times the probability
of bankruptcy; this is reduced by the cost of collection, µ. Finally, there is the recovery of
collateral in the event of bankruptcy minus its liquidation cost δ. On the right hand side is
the cost of the funds the bank has received from depositors at the riskless rate, R.
Substitute from the bankruptcy threshold ZB = (1 + RK)ωA + cN in the first term of
the LHS and on the RHS for B from firms’ balance sheet B = A−N + cN.This gives:
[1−F (ω)](1+RK)ωA+(1−µ)G(ω)(1+RK)A+ cN(1− δF (ω)) = (1+R)(A−N + cN)
Let Γ(ω) = [1− F (ω)]ω +G(ω). Divide by N to obtain:
[Γ(ω)− µG(ω)](1 +RK)L = (1 +R)(L− 1) + c(1 +R− 1 + δF (ω)) so that we obtain:
L = 1+R−c[R+δF (ω)]
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)
where Ψ(ω) = Γ(ω)− µG(ω)
This is the banks’ leverage offer curve. It can be readily verified that it slopes upward
and is convex in [1− Γ(ω)] space- as shown in the diagram below.
Note that dL/dω > 0, dL/dRK > 0, dl/dδ < 0
c) To obtain the overall contract firms’ utility (returns), relative to their cost of funds,
are maximised. These are given by:
∞∫
ω
{(1+RK)ωA+cN−ZB}dF (ω)
N(1+R)
; now also note that from the bankruptcy threshold ZB = (1 +
RK)ωA + cN . So it can be seen that the firms’ returns are unaffected by the existence
of collateral, essentially because it remains as part of their gross return if they do not go
bankrupt but also, for given total assets A, the borrowing costs at which they will choose to
go bankrupt rise by the amount of this collateral.
Substituting into the returns from the bankruptcy threshold gives the overall returns as:
∞∫
ω
{(1+RK)(ω−ω)A}dF (ω)
N(1+R)
= (1+R
K)
(1+R)
L[1 − Γ(ω)] where the first two terms give the total ex-
pected return to the firm from its invested capital (A) as a proportion of its funds, N(1+R)
and the last term [1 − Γ(ω)] is the share of this that goes to the firm (the bank takes the
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loan costs if the firm survives and the returns below ω if it does not).
This utility function gives indifference curves in (ω,L) space, that are concave. An
interior optimum is reached.
Banks' Leverage 
offer curve
ω
ω*
L* L
Firms' 
Indifference 
Curves
Figure 13: The optimum contract for (ω¯∗, L∗) for given Rk, R, δ
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We can compute this optimum by maximising (1+R
K)
(1+R)
L[1 − Γ(ω)] wrt (ω, L) subject to
the leverage offer curve from the banks L = 1+R−c[R+δF (ω)]
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)
(from b above). Solving for the
implicit function this gives in ω gives us finally the firm’s optimum choice of ω as the solution
of:
{1+R− c[R+ δF (ω)]}{1+R−Φ
′
(1+RK)} = {−cδF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Γ′(ω)
}{1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)}
where Φ
′
= Ψ
′
(ω)
Γ′(ω)
+ (1− Ψ
′
(ω)
Γ′(ω)
)Ψ(ω) ≈ 1
In addition we have the leverage offer curve defining L in terms of ω and so giving us the
total (ω, L) solution.
We can now create two equations in (ω, L) from the firm’s optimum and the banks’
leverage offer. We can rewrite the firm’s optimum choice using the banks’ leverage offer as:
1) L{1 +R−Φ
′
(1 +RK)} = {−cδF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Γ′(ω)
}
and then we can add the banks’ leverage offer:
2) L = 1+R−c[R+δF (ω)]
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)
We now investigate the comparative static properties of changes around the equilibrium
by taking the total differential of this two-equation system in dL, dω, dδ and dRK . We will
evaluate the derivatives at an equilibrium where δ = 0; we do this for convenience because
we will be dealing with a heavily monetised collateral set-up where it is close to zero. Note
that in the rest of the DSGE model lnLt=kt − nt is determined while δ is determined by
the provision of M0 as an alternative to illiquid collateral. Thus we can regard these as
exogenous to this banking model subsector which then solves for ω and RK (the return on
capital required to make the needed leverage possible). These two elements are internal to
the bank contract decision and unobservable in the public domain but in turn from these
we can solve for the observable cost of the bank credit, Z, from the bankruptcy threshold as
Z = ((1+R
K)ωL+c
L−1+c
.
We write the total differential as:
1) {1 +R− Φ
′
(1 +RK)}dL+ L(−Φ
′
)dRK = (derivative = 0)dω + {−cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Γ′(ω)
}dδ
and
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2) dL = L{ Ψ
′
(ω)(1+RK)
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)
}dω + L{ Ψ(ω)
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)
}dRK + { −cF (ω)]
1+R−Ψ(ω)(1+RK)
}dδ
Our interest lies in the effect of δ on the equilibrium value s of RK and ω, and thus on
Z. We begin by noting from 1) that
dRK
dδ
= { cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
LΦ′Γ′ (ω)
} = { cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
LΦ′ [1−F (ω)]
} ≻ 0
and from 2) that:
dω
dδ
= dω
dRK
.dR
K
dδ
+ dω
dδ
= { −Ψ(ω)
Ψ
′
(ω)(1+RK)
}{ cF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
LΦ
′
Γ
′
(ω)
} + cF (ω)
LΨ
′
(ω)(1+RK)
= cF (ω)
LΨ
′
(ω)(1+RK)
{1 −
F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′Γ′ (ω)
}
= cF (ω)
LΨ′(ω)(1+RK)
{1− F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
} since we note that Γ
′
(ω) = [1− F (ω)].
The sign of the last total derivative is strictly ambiguous and needs to be computed
numerically. Consider a bankruptcy rate around 2.3% and a standard normal distribution of
lnω (i.e. with a standard deviation of unity, so that the bankruptcy threshold will be exactly
two standard deviations below the mean). ω will then take the value of 0.135 (=e−2); F (ω) =
0.023; F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
= 2.3;Ψ(ω) ≃ Γ(ω) = [1− F (ω)]ω = 0.13x0.977 = 0.127 since G(ω) ≃ 0; it also
follows as noted above that Φ
′
= Ψ
′
(ω)
Γ′(ω)
thus {1 − F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
} = 0.73 and so is clearly
positive for any values around that size of bankruptcy rate and standard deviation. The
reason essentially is that the banks’ share of returns,Γ(ω), is under the assumed competitive
nature of banks quite modest; and so a rise in the rate of return has only a modest effect
on profits while a rise in the bankruptcy threshold has a much larger effect. Hence at zero
profits with given leverage the trade-off of threshold given up for extra required rate of return
is small.
Finally, we find
dZ
dδ
= L
L−1+c
{[1+RK]dω
dδ
+ω dR
K
dδ
} = c
L−1+c
{
F (ω)
Ψ′(ω)
{1− F
′
(ω)
F (ω)
Ψ(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
}+ {ωF
′
(ω)[1−Γ(ω)]
Φ′ [1−F (ω)]
}
}
>
0, on the assumption that dω
dδ
> 0 as above.
Thus finally since δ is reduced by M0 injections we can conclude that a rise in M0 will
reduce the required return on capital and also the credit premium.
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9 Appendix 2: VAR IRFs
In this appendix we show how the model, given that it jointly predicts (within 95% bounds)
the VAR coefficients that determine the IRFs of shocks on the three key macro variables,
thereby also broadly predicts these IRFs. Because the Wald test is of the joint behaviour
of the VAR coefficients and on the variances of the three variable residuals, there is not a
perfect correspondence with the individual IRFs. However, it can be seen, as expected, that
most of the IRfs lie mostly within the bounds.
It is the IRFs that policymakers are interested in, as pointed out by Christiano et al.
(2005). They need to be assured that empirically the IRFs the model implies should appear
in the data actually do so within statistical bounds (of course the IRFs implied for data
behaviour reflect both the model structural IRFs and sample shock variations). Then they
feel able to use the model’s (structural) IRFs to determine the effect of shocks and of policies
to offset shocks.
The VAR innovations are identified throughout by the model; we have no independent
way of identifying the VAR innovations (any such ways suggested are based on some ‘non-
controversial’ model restrictions; however, the model here is non-controversial in its current
innovation structure and so we use it.) The testing kicks in on the variances of the VAR
innovations and on the lagged effects of each variable (the VAR coefficients).
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Figure 14: VAR IRFs for an exogenous demand shock
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Figure 15: VAR IRFs for a consumer preference shock
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Figure 16: VAR IRFs for a investment shock
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Figure 17: VAR IRFs for a monetary shock
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Figure 18: VAR IRFs for a productivity shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−2
−1
0
1
Output       
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−0.5
0
0.5
1
Inflation    
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−0.5
0
0.5
Interest Rate
Figure 19: VAR IRFs for a price mark-up shock
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Figure 20: VAR IRFs for a wage mark-up shock
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−0.05
0
0.05
Output       
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
Inflation    
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20−10
−5
0
5x 10
−3 Interest Rate
Figure 21: VAR IRFs for a labour supply shock
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Figure 22: VAR IRFs for a premium shock
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Figure 23: VAR IRFs for a networth shock
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Figure 24: VAR IRFs for an M0 shock
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